Point
of
Law
Larry Welch
Director, KBI
Supreme Court Decisions posted on the Kansas Bureau of Investigations
Website.
These court cases were reviewed by the director and he inserted his comments
on the cases. Please read these cases to obtain valuable practical information.
Click on a
here
to read the listed decisions.
U.S. v. Banks
U.S. Supreme Court • December 2, 2003
Reprinted from March 2004 edition of "Kansas Peace
Officer".
(A
unanimous Supreme Court holds that the Fourth Amendment and a federal statute
were not violated by law enforcement officers when they forcibly entered a small
apartment, in the execution of a federal search warrant for narcotics, only 15
to 20 seconds after "knocking and announcing:" This reverses a holding of the
very reversible U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.)
Lashawn Lowell Banks was in
the shower of his very small one-bathroom, two-bedroom, North Las Vegas
apartment at 2:00 in the afternoon when he heard a loud commotion at his front
door. He emerged from the shower, dripping wet, covered with soap, and nude.
(There goes any hope of a concealed carry charge.) The first thing he noticed,
in addition to the significant draft, was that many law enforcement officers,
many of them hooded, all armed, some with words like "FBI" and "POLICE" and
"SWAT" on their attire, were dominating the small hallway between his bathroom
and the front door. Then he noticed that some of the officers were holding a
battering ram and that his front door was no longer vertical.
He was first forced to the
floor and handcuffed. Then, still slippery, he was lifted up and placed, naked
as a jailbird, as we used to say in western Kansas (maybe it was "jaybird," come
to think of it) on a chair at the kitchen table.
Now, no doubt, he is
starting to regret having 11 ounces of crack cocaine, three handguns, a drug
scale, and $6,000 in cash in his tiny apartment. And, oh yeah, having sold crack
to an undercover officer earlier.
After two agents had sat
down to interrogate him at the table and the other officers searched the
apartment, finding the drugs and guns he wasn't supposed to have, Banks was
permitted to put on underwear (I presume with the handcuffs removed) and was
then interviewed for approximately 45 minutes.
The results of that
interrogation, and what Banks did or did not say, are not relevant in this
appeal. Banks raised Miranda and Fifth and Sixth Amendment issues, but the
district court, and even the Ninth Circuit Court, paid little attention to those
concerns, dismissing Banks' arguments quickly. The sole issue here is a Fourth
Amendment issue relating to the law enforcement entry into Banks' apartment.
What happened prior to the
interruption of Banks' shower was that the joint search team of FBI agents and
North Las Vegas police officers appeared at the front door and back door of the
apartment with a search warrant. Officers followed the federal statutory (Title
18 U.S. Code 3109) "knock and announce" procedure by knocking loudly on the
front door and announcing, "Police! Search warrant!" After 15 to 20 seconds,
with no response from within, the armed SWAT officers made a forced entry into
Banks' apartment.
Officers later testified
that they had not heard any noises from within during the 15- to 20-second
waiting period, and one officer at the back door even testified that all he
heard was the loud knocking at the front door and the shouts of "Police! Search
warrant!"
Banks complained that the
police entry, only 15 to 20 seconds after the "knock and announce," violated the
Fourth Amendment and the federal statute, and that, therefore, the evidence
should be suppressed.
Basically, the defense
argued that the evidence must be suppressed because the officers failed to wait
a reasonable period of time before forcefully entering Banks' residence, search
warrant or no search warrant. The defense claimed such a quick entry can only
follow exigent circumstances or a refusal of admittance, after the officers
announce their identity and purpose and demand entry.
The U.S. District Court
denied Banks' motion to suppress. Banks, reluctantly, pled guilty to possession
of a controlled substance with intent to distribute and also to being a drug
user in possession of a firearm. He reserved his right to appeal, and he did
appeal. The famous U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ("pledge of
allegiance-under God") reversed Banks' conviction, holding that there were no
exigent circumstances in this situation and no refusal of admittance by Banks.
There simply was no justification of the quick entry by law enforcement. The
court emphasized there was no response of any kind by Banks, let alone a refusal
of admittance.
"Our task is to determine
what constitutes a reasonable waiting period before officers may infer that they
have been denied admittance." (And, obviously, 15 to 20 seconds is not a
reasonable waiting period.)
"In assessing the
reasonableness of the duration of the officers' wait, we review all factors that
an officer reasonably should consider in making the decision to enter without an
affirmative denial. Those factors include, but are not limited to: (a) size of
the residence; (b) location of the residence; (c) location of the officers in
relation to the main living or sleeping areas of the residence; (d) time of day;
(e) nature of the suspected offense; (f) evidence demonstrating the suspect's
guilt; (g) suspect's prior convictions and, if any, the type of offense for
which he was convicted; and (h) any other observations triggering the senses of
the officers that reasonably would lead one to believe that immediate entry was
necessary."
Here, in a wonderful
opinion, the Big Court dismisses the Ninth Circuit's strange four-part scheme
for "knock-and-announce" search warrant entries and upholds the Banks' entry and
seizures. Rightfully worrying about destruction of the evidence, given Banks'
indoor plumbing, and about officer safety, as the seconds ticked off, Justice
Souter, writing for the unanimous court, said, "Though we agree ... that this
call is a close one ... we think that after 15 or 20 seconds without a
response, police could fairly suspect that cocaine would be gone if they were
reticent any longer ... time will vary with the size of the establishment,
perhaps five seconds to open a motel room door, or several minutes to move
through a townhouse ... Police seeking a stolen piano may be able to spend more
time to make sure they really need the battering ram." (Is this a wonderful
country or what?)
"Absent exigency, the
police must knock and receive an actual refusal or wait out the time necessary
to infer one. But in a case like this, where the officers knocked and announced
their presence, and forcibly entered after a reasonable suspicion of exigency
had ripened, their entry satisfied (the statute) as well as the Fourth
Amendment, even without refusal of admittance."
(Bottom
line? And you can easily recite the Pledge of Allegiance in less than 15 to 20
seconds! Try it.)
Maryland v. Pringle
U.S. Supreme Court • December 15, 2003
Reprinted from March 2004 edition of "Kansas Peace
Officer".
(In a unanimous decision,
the Big Court rules that a police officer who obtained permission to search a
car during a traffic stop, and who found cocaine in the back seat and cash in
the glove compartment, had probable cause to arrest all three occupants of the
car, including the front-seat passenger, and let God and the courts sort it
out.)
Joseph Jermaine Pringle was
a frontseat passenger in a car owned by, and driven by, his friend, Donte
Carlos Partlow. Another friend, Otis Calvin Smith, was a back-seat passenger. It
was 3:00 A.M., and they were in Baltimore County, Maryland, headed for
Westminster, Maryland, for a party.
Officer Jeffrey Snyder of
the Baltimore County Police Department, on, as we always say, routine patrol,
stopped the car for a traffic violation. He asked Partlow for license and
registration, and when Partlow opened the glove compartment to obtain those
documents, the officer observed a large roll of cash therein. The officer said
nothing about the money.
The officer ran a computer
check on the car and driver. Nothing. He returned to the car, asked Partlow to
step out, and issued him an oral warning for his driving deficiencies. He then
inquired of Partlow whether or not he had "anything in the vehicle, any drugs,
weapons, narcotics in the vehicle?" Partlow replied that he did not. Well then,
the officer asked, could he search the vehicle? Partlow, then obviously
intending to use the "TS" defense (Temporarily Stupid), gave permission to
search his car.
Officer Snyder asked the
defendant and Smith to step out of the car. He patted them down and then had all
three sit on the curb while he searched the vehicle. (Meanwhile, the party was
already starting, no doubt.) During the consensual search, Officer Snyder found
$763 in the glove compartment and five baggies of cocaine in a backseat
armrest.
The officer then asked all
three who owned the money and coke. No answer. Then he told them he'd arrest
all three if one didn't own up to ownership. None claimed ownership and, sure
enough, all three were arrested and transported to the police station. (There
goes the party.)
Finally, between 4:00
A.M. and 5:00
A.M., following a waiver of his Miranda rights, Pringle did the honorable thing.
He gave oral and written confessions admitting the coke and money were his and
that neither Partlow or Smith had known anything about the stuff. He explained
he had intended to use the coke for sex at the party, not sell it. Partlow and
Smith were released and never charged.
Pringle was convicted of
possession with intent to distribute cocaine and possession of cocaine. He was
sentenced to ten years, without possibility of parole. On appeal, he argued
simply that there was no probable cause to arrest him. He did not complain of
the search, acknowledging the owner driver’s consent was properly given. His
contention was that his confession followed an illegal arrest and should have
been suppressed.
The Court of Special Appeals
for Baltimore County affirmed the conviction and upheld the arrest. But the
Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed, holding there was not probable cause to
arrest the defendant when he had not admitted ownership of the cocaine. Money in
the glove compartment and drugs in the back seat didn't provide probable cause
for his arrest. The Maryland state court explained, "Simply stated, a policy of
arresting everyone until somebody confesses is constitutionally unacceptable."
(Who wants to tell Detective Andy Sipowicz?)
Here the Big Court reverses
the Maryland court and dismisses Pringle's "simply guilt-by-association"
defense. "It is uncontested in the present case that the officer, upon
recovering the five plastic baggies containing suspected cocaine, had probable
cause to believe a felony had been committed ... The sole question is whether
the officer had probable cause to believe that Pringle committed that crime....
We think it an entirely reasonable inference from these facts that any or all
three of the occupants had knowledge
of, and exercised dominion and control over, the cocaine.
Thus a reasonable officer could conclude that there was probable cause to
believe Pringle committed the crime of possession of cocaine, either solely or
jointly... Pringle and his two companions were in a relatively small automobile
(Nissan Maxima) ... a car passenger ... will often be engaged in a common
enterprise with the driver and have the same interest in concealing the fruits
or the evidence of their wrongdoing ... Here we think it was reasonable for the
officer to infer a common enterprise among the three men. The quantity of drugs
and cash in the car indicated the likelihood of drug dealing, an enterprise to
which a dealer would be unlikely to admit an innocent person with the potential
to furnish evidence against him."
(Bottom line? Gee, what if
it had been a 12-passenger van with full occupancy?)
Illinois v. Lidster
U.S. Supreme Court • January 13, 2004
Reprinted from March 2004 edition of "Kansas Peace
Officer".
(The Big Court, 6-3, reverses the Illinois
Supreme Court and says there's a world of difference between a suspicionless
checkpoint at which police stop vehicles to look for evidence of drug violations
by those particular motorists, ruled unconstitutional in
Indianapolis v. Edmond,
531 U.S. 32 (2000),
and a brief, non-intrusive,
information-seeking checkpoint, wherein police simply seek information
regarding a previous crime most likely committed by others, ruled reasonable
and constitutional herein.)
In Lombard, Illinois, there was a fatal
hit-and-run accident and the police were seeking the full-sized pickup truck,
possibly a Ford Bronco, believed to be implicated in the accident. A 70year-old
bicyclist had been struck and killed. Wisely, I thought, the police decided
they would place an informational checkpoint at the precise point of the
accident, exactly one week later. The time, midnight, coincided with people
leaving work at a nearby U.S. Postal facility and an industrial park near the
scene of the accident. Each motorist was stopped for ten to 15 seconds and given
a prepared flyer reflecting information regarding the accident and the
suspected vehicle, seeking the public's help and providing officers' names and
phone numbers that could be called. Between six and 12 police vehicles, with
flashing lights, participated in the checkpoint.
The checkpoint was neither advertised nor
videotaped. Detective Ray Vasil was wearing an orange reflective vest with
"police" thereon and standing 15 feet from the checkpoint. A line of cars formed
at the checkpoint, and as each vehicle pulled up to Detective Vasil, he handed
the informational flyer to the driver.
Everything went well until Robert S. Lidster,
intoxicated and driving his Mazda minivan, almost hit our detective. So, with
this motorist, Detective Vasil goes a bit further and asked for a driver's
license and proof of insurance. Lidster's speech is slurred, and the detective
smells alcohol on his breath. He is turned over to another officer, who
administers a variety of sobriety tests. Lidster fails them all, is arrested for
DUI, and convicted thereof.
An Illinois appellate court, in effect,
says, "Not so fast," and reversed the conviction, holding that the checkpoint
violated the Fourth Amendment and was contrary to what the U.S. Supreme Court
said police could do with roadblocks or checkpoints in
Indianapolis v. Edmond.
The Illinois Supreme Court agreed the police
were wrong and that Mr. Lidster was wronged.
The problem is that the Big Court, in
Indianapolis v. Edmond,
held that the Fourth Amendment's requirement
of individualized suspicion for seizure does not allow police to conduct
suspicionless roadblocks designed primarily to serve general interest in crime
control. Or, as in Edmond, to look, randomly, for drug violators.
By the way, the Illinois Association of
Chiefs of Police joined with the Illinois Attorney General in this appeal,
urging the reversal of the Illinois Supreme Court and the approval of the
roadblock, or checkpoint.
"The Illinois Supreme Court called the
operation a roadblock. This was inaccurate. A roadblock is the complete
blocking of a road in order to prevent any traffic from continuing on the path.
It is a barricade or an obstruction across a road set up to prevent the escape
or passage, as of a fugitive or enemy troops. What was done in this case was not
a roadblock, as passage through the obstruction was possible after dealing with
the authorities. It was a checkpoint. The complete blocking of passage makes a
roadblock a more intrusive seizure than a checkpoint. Calling checkpoints
roadblocks inaccurately prejudices them and should be avoided."
(Quoted from the brief of the Criminal
Justice Legal Foundation, who also joined with the state in this appeal.)
Now, at
least, you know the difference between a roadblock and a checkpoint. Lidster,
of course, challenged the lawfulness of his DUI arrest and conviction, arguing
that the evidence had been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. He
based his defense on Indianapolis
v. Edmond.
However, here the U.S. Supreme Court says
that both Lidster and the Illinois Supreme Court are wrong and also very
confused about the Edmond decision. The Court explained,
"Edmond involved a checkpoint at which police
stopped vehicles to look for evidence of drug crimes committed by occupants of
those vehicles. After stopping a vehicle at the checkpoint, police would examine
(from outside the vehicle) the vehicle's interior; they would walk a drug
sniffing dog around the exterior; and, if they found sufficient evidence of drug
(or other) crimes, they would arrest the vehicle's occupants. We found that
police had set up this checkpoint primarily for general crime control purposes,
i.e., to detect evidence of
ordinary criminal wrongdoing. We noted that the stop was made without
individualized suspicion. And we held that the Fourth Amendment forbids such a
stop, in the absence of special circumstances."
But, heck, the Big Court holds here,
"The checkpoint stop here differs
significantly from that in
Edmond. The stop's primary law
enforcement purpose was not to determine whether a vehicle's occupants were
committing a crime, but to ask vehicle occupants, as members of the public, for
their help in providing information about a crime in all likelihood committed by
others. The police expected the information elicited to help them apprehend,
not the vehicle's occupants, but other individuals."
The Court liked that the stops were brief and
that actual police contact with each driver lasted only seconds. No Fourth
Amendment violation.
(Bottom
line: Even Justice Stevens, in dissent, agreed that,
"There is a valid and important
distinction between seizing a person to determine whether she has committed a
crime and seizing a person to ask whether she has any information about an
unknown person who committed a crime a week earlier."
No matter
Lidster is a he.)
State of Kansas v. Crawford
Kansas
Supreme Court • April 18, 2003
Reprinted from September 2003 edition of "Kansas Peace
Officer".
(Remember the decision by the
Kansas Court
of Appeals in this
matter, August 23,
2002, holding that Johnson County Deputy Sheriff Mark
Leiker did
not have reasonable suspicion enough, from an anonymous telephone
call, to make a Terry stop of a potentially drunk and/or reckless motorist?
Wrong! He did so, holds the Kansas Big Court.)
It's approximately 2:00 P.M., and a warm August day in Johnson County, Kansas
(birthplace of my two year old grandson, Harrison Kester Brown). Johnson County
Deputy Sheriff Mark Leiker hears the dispatcher announce that an anonymous cell
phone call has been received from a concerned motorist advising there's a
"reckless" driver in a black Dodge Dakota pickup truck, with Oklahoma license
plates, headed north from the county line on 169 Highway.
Since Deputy Leiker was already in close proximity, he positioned himself on
169 Highway about one mile north of the county line. Within two minutes, he
observed a black Dodge Dakota pickup truck, Oklahoma license plate, pass him,
headed north. He very quickly stopped the vehicle, without observing any
reckless driving, or indeed, any apparent traffic violations.
The
driver is William Alfred Crawford, Jr., well on his way to his third DUI
offense, it would appear.
Crawford appeared intoxicated. He exited the pickup before being instructed to
do so and swayed or staggered as he walked. He was forced to hold onto the truck
bed railing and our deputy noticed a faint odor of alcohol. He also observed
that Crawford's eyes were bloodshot and his clothes disheveled, as if he had
been sleeping in them. Crawford failed three different field sobriety tests, the
preliminary breath test, as well as the Intoxilyzer breath test (twice the legal
limit). He's charged with DUI.
The
issue became, since the officer observed no wrongdoing, did the anonymous call
permit the stop of the vehicle, from which came the evidence for the DUI
charge?
The
district court and the Kansas Court of Appeals ruled for the defendant, holding
there was no corroboration of the anonymous caller's allegations prior to the
stop. And, therefore, the evidence of intoxication derived from the stop must
be suppressed.
But
here the Kansas Supreme Court vindicates Deputy Sheriff Leiker.
"The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court correctly ruled that the
anonymous tip failed to provide an adequate basis to justify the stop and
detention, requiring suppression of the evidence. More specifically, the
question is whether a stop is legal when it is based upon an anonymous tip
stating a vehicle's make, model, style, color, the state of origin of its
license plate, highway location, and direction of travel, all of which was
corroborated by the law enforcement officer before the stop and also stating
the conclusory allegation that the vehicle was being driven recklessly, which
the officer did not attempt to corroborate before the stop. We hold the district
court erred in holding the stop was illegal. We therefore reverse the district
court and the Court of Appeals and remand for trial."
The
lower courts and the Kansas Supreme Court did agree that this decision turned
on the interpretation of Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the
creator of all reasonable suspicion law, and on a case already handled by the
Kansas Supreme Court from Hays, Kansas,
State v. Slater,
267 Kansas 694 (1999).
Based on Terry
and
Slater,
the lower courts interpreted Crawford's
circumstances one way. The Kansas Supreme Court interpreted them another way.
The correct way.
In
Slater,
a
Hays police officer on routine patrol was advised by the dispatcher that an
anonymous telephone caller reported a "possible drunk driver" leaving Burger
King in a black pickup bearing license plate HEK 477. The dispatcher had also
run a 10-28 and informed the officer the license plate number came back to one
Walter Slater, 2212 Downing, Hays. The officer proceeded to Burger King and,
observing no such vehicle there, headed toward 2212 Downing. He saw the pickup a
block from home and, without observing any signs of poor driving while
following the pickup a block, stopped Slater.
As he got out of his pickup, a beer can fell to the ground and he stumbled and
staggered prior to arrest.
The
Slater trial court, like the Crawford trial court, suppressed the
evidence arising out of the stop and dismissed the charge, holding the
anonymous tip did not constitute reasonable suspicion, under Terry, that
a crime was being committed.
The
Kansas Supreme Court in Slater, as here in Crawford, restored
reason. In Slater, "... we held that the information given by the anonymous
caller and the officer's corroboration of the description and license number of
the vehicle before the investigatory stop was sufficiently reliable to provide
the officer with a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity."
Moreover, "The touchstone of the Terry stop at issue in Slater
and in the case at hand is reasonable suspicion of criminal activity ... Just as
the drunk
driving alleged ... in Slater ...
is a crime in Kansas ... so is the reckless driving alleged by the anonymous
informant in the case at hand ... which caused the officer to stop the vehicle
without corroboration."
Describing the two sets of circumstances as "remarkably similar," the Kansas
Supreme Court reiterated its three-part test established in Slater to
analyze a tip's reliability, and concluded Deputy Leiker, in the totality of
circumstances, had sufficient basis for an investigatory stop ... "(1) the
type of tip or informant involved; (2) the detail given about the observed
criminal activity; and (3) whether the police officer's personal observations
corroborate the information supplied in the tip."
(Bottom
line: Now my grandson, Harrison Kester Brown, can, and will, move back to his
birthplace. I'm not kidding.)
Chavez v. Martinez
U.S. Supreme Court • May 27, 2003
Reprinted from September 2003 edition of "Kansas Peace
Officer".
(As
this case worked its way toward the U.S. Supreme Court, it became, in my humble
opinion, one of the most widely misunderstood, and/or mislabeled cases in
years, by the media and some law enforcement observers. Hailed as a landmark
Miranda case, with the very future of Miranda warnings at stake,
the real issue was simply civil liability and the qualified immunity, or not,
of a police officer following coercive interrogation of a suspect.)
One
November night two police officers were investigating narcotics activity in a
residential-area vacant lot in Oxnard, California. While questioning one
individual, they heard a bicycle approaching. Officer Salinas ordered the bike
rider, Oliverio Martinez, to stop, dismount, spread his legs and
place his hands behind his head. Mr. Martinez complied.
During a protective pat-down frisk, the officer discovered a knife in the
suspect's waistband. Officer Salinas alerted his partner, Officer Pena, and
started to place handcuffs on Martinez. Officer Salinas later claimed that, at
this point, Martinez pulled away from him. Martinez denies that he resisted. In
any event, a struggle ensued between suspect Martinez and Officer Salinas.
Both officers testified that Martinez did not attempt to hit or kick them and
that Officer Salinas struck the only blow. They claimed that Martinez drew
Officer Salinas' gun and pointed it at them. Martinez said that he merely
grabbed Officer Salinas' gun as the latter began drawing his weapon.
All
three participants agree that Officer Salinas cried out, "He's got my gun:"
Officer Pena then drew her weapon and fired several times. One round struck
Martinez in the face, damaging his optic nerve and rendering him blind. Another
round struck a vertebra, paralyzing his legs. Three more rounds struck one leg,
in the knee joint area. The officers then handcuffed Martinez.
The
patrol supervisor, Sergeant Chavez, with paramedics, arrived on the scene within
minutes. He rode to the emergency room in the ambulance with Martinez.
As
emergency room personnel treated Martinez, Sergeant Chavez commenced a
45-minute taped interview of the suspect, without the benefit of Miranda
warnings.
The
medical staff repeatedly requested the sergeant to leave the room. The tape
demonstrates that the interviewer did leave several times, but always returned
and resumed questioning. He turned the tape recorder off upon each departure
and the actual recorded conversation was approximately ten minutes in length.
Martinez, throughout the interview, complained he was in pain, was choking, was
dying and could not move his legs. He drifted in and out of consciousness. He
actually said he was dying eight times, complained of pain 14 times, and two
times said he did not want to talk anymore.
Sergeant Chavez finally left for good only when the medics moved Martinez out of
the emergency room for a CAT scan.
Martinez survived and sued the city of Oxnard, the police chief, and Officers
Salinas and Pena under Title 18, Section 1983, U.S. Code, alleging the arresting
officers violated his constitutional rights by stopping him without probable
cause and using excessive force. That lawsuit is another matter for a jury and
does not concern us now.
What we're concerned with here is that Martinez also brought civil action
against Sergeant Chavez alleging the sergeant violated his constitutional rights
by subjecting him to a coercive interrogation while receiving critical medical
care.
The
district court denied Sergeant Chavez' defense of qualified immunity and
granted summary judgment for Martinez on his claim that Chavez violated his 5th
and 14th Amendment rights in the coercive interrogation. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 9th Circuit affirmed that holding. Chavez appealed those rulings
in this action.
In
argument before the highest court on December 4, the attorney for Sergeant
Chavez, joined by the U.S. Deputy Solicitor General, claimed that a coercive
interrogation by police does not violate one's constitutional rights unless,
and until, the resulting statements are actually introduced into evidence in
court. And even if it does violate one's constitutional rights, the police
officer enjoys qualified immunity unless his conduct shocks the conscience of a
reasonable person, and/or he should have known the action was unconstitutional.
The
attorney for Martinez argued the constitutional violation occurs at the time of
the offense and does not have to wait for use of the statements in
court and trial. And, he protested, of course Sergeant Chavez knew his coercive
interrogation violated Martinez' constitutional rights. Therefore, he is liable
and not entitled to qualified immunity.
"Res
Ipsa Baloney," says the U.S. Supreme Court, May 27, 2003, to the argument of the
attorney for Martinez. (I'm paraphrasing, roughly.)
"An officer is entitled to qualified immunity if his alleged conduct did
not violate a constitutional right.
"And the Court holds that "mere compulsive questioning" does not violate
the Constitution. "Statements compelled by police interrogation may not be
used against a defendant in a criminal case, but it is not until such use that
the Self-Incrimination Clause (5thAmendment) is violated."
"Chavez's failure to read Miranda
warnings to Martinez did not violate Martinez's constitutional rights and
cannot be grounds for a civil action. And the absence of a criminal case in
which Martinez was compelled to be a witness against himself defeats his core
5th Amendment Claim:"
(Bottom line: An important ruling, but not because of earth-shaking Miranda
implications.)
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