Point of Law

Last week, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed 9-0 that police officers may enter a home  without a warrant if they have an “objectively reasonable basis for believing” that someone  inside needs emergency assistance.  

William Case had called his girlfriend telling her that he was going to kill himself, that he  sounded “erratic” because he had probably been drinking, that he had past mental health issues,  and that he had earlier attempted “suicide by cop.” Case then told the girlfriend that he would  shoot any responding law enforcement, but the girlfriend heard a clicking that she believed was  the cocking of a gun, and a “pop” followed by “just dead air.” The girlfriend called 911. 

Officers responded, knocked on the house doors, yelled into an open window, and could  see through a window, empty beer cans, an empty handgun holster, and a notepad with writing  on it. Case did not respond. Officers called a supervisor. After 40 minutes and discussions of  the possible scenarios, officers entered the house without a search warrant.  

While in the house, one of the officers encountered Case hiding in a closet. Case threw  open the closet curtain and appeared to the officer to be holding “black object” that looked like a  gun. Fearing Case was going to shoot, the officer shot Case. A handgun was recovered near  Case.  

Case recovered from his wound and was criminally charged with assaulting the police  officer. Prior to trial, Case moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the officers’ home entry, arguing that the police needed, but did not have, probable cause to enter his house.  The trial court denied suppression, and the Montana Supreme Court agreed. The Big Court  agreed to review Case’s probable cause question, and last week Case lost his argument. 

Because such “emergency assistance” calls are not criminal investigations, the Court  declined to use the better-known criminal suspicion standards of “reasonable suspicion” and  “probable cause.” Instead, the justices said that what they first held in 2006 in Brigham City v.  Stewart was still sufficient today. “Brigham City’s reasonableness standard means just what it  says, with no further gloss . . . Rather, Brigham City formulated its own standard for dealing with  household emergencies—again, whether an officer has ‘an objectively reasonable basis for  believing’ that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such harm.” 

The justices reminded us that an emergency-aid entry “provides no basis to search the  premises beyond what is reasonably needed to deal with the emergency while maintaining  officers’ safety.” And, that “[t]he objective reasonableness of an officer’s conduct under  Brigham City, as in other Fourth Amendment contexts, is evaluated by looking at the totality of  the circumstances.”  

One last note: Justice Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion (meaning that she agreed  with the Court’s opinion but wanted to add some thoughts). No other justice joined her concurring opinion, but what she brings up is important to think about. The justice said that

“when an officer is called to respond to a person at risk of suicide, however, entering the house  may not always be the objectively reasonable course of action to ‘preserve life or avoid serious  injury’ . . . [because][s]tudies show that individuals with serious mental-health conditions are  disproportionately likely to be injured and seven times more likely to be killed during police  interactions compared to the general population . . . [and][o]nce the decision is made to enter,  moreover, the ‘manner’ of the officers’ entry and their subsequent conduct inside must also be  reasonable.” 

Colin

Last week, the Big Court agreed to hear this term a GEOFENCE WARRANT case from  the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. Geofence warrants are used to identify possible suspect  cellphones that were within a certain geographical area during the time of the crime.  

Okello Chatrie was convicted of robbing a Richmond, Virginia credit union of  $195,000.00. Some of the evidence used against Chatrie was obtained from a series of geofence  warrants to Google.  

The Fourth Amendment arguments surrounding geofence warrants have been bubbling  for a few years now, and the government has been generally successful so far in the lower courts.  Here is another example of the law trying to catch up to today’s technology. 

The Court should have a decision by summer. 

Colin

[As noted here some months ago, Point of Law will from time-to-time reprint cases summarized by other sources. The following cases are recent 10 th Circuit opinions as reviewed by the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center’s Legal Division]:

(Reprinted from The Informer, FLETC Legal Division, December, 2025)

United States v. Nahkai
No. 24-4058 (10th Cir. 2025)

Andy Nahkai answered the door on February 10, 2022, and found himself talking to a Navajo Nation investigator and an FBI Special Agent. The agents wanted to question Nahkai about allegations of sexual abuse made by a family member and suggested they do so in their vehicle, rather than inside the home with Nahkai’s wife within earshot.

Nahkai followed the officers to an unmarked pickup truck which had two indicia of law enforcement—a radio control and a rifle rack—and seated himself in the passenger seat. He was never handcuffed or touched by the officers in any way, and the vehicle was unlocked for the duration of the interview, which lasted approximately 41 minutes.

Shortly after the start of the interview, the FBI agent asked pointed questions about why the minor family member did not live at the home any longer. Nahkai explained that Social Services removed the minor because she reported his wife for physical abuse and him for sexual abuse, and the agent immediately began asking confrontational questions about “massages” Nahkai received from the minor that could have been considered sexual abuse. After Nahkai admitted the massages were of an intimate nature, the agent said, “Alright, well uh, I think we’re gonna talk with [Nahkai’s wife] here for just a second now if that’s alright. You’re good to go inside.”

Once Nahkai returned to his home, the agent and investigator followed up with a later arrest. Nahkai was charged with two counts of abusive sexual contact with a child while within Indian country, 18 U.S.C. § 2244(c) & 1153, and one count of abusive sexual contact with a child age 12-16 while within Indian country, 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(3) & 1153, based on his statements.

Nahkai moved to have his statements suppressed, arguing that he was not given any Miranda warnings during what he perceived to be a custodial interview. The government, however, argued that Nahkai was not “in custody” for purposes of Miranda, and he gave voluntary statements in an unlocked police vehicle parked outside of his home where he was free to leave (and did so).

The district court ruled the statements inadmissible, based on several factors, including: 1) whether officers advised the suspect that he was not required to answer questions and/or that he could terminate the interview; 2) the nature of the questioning; and 3) whether police dominated the atmosphere of the encounter. While the district court relied heavily on the first factor, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling, noting that the failure of the agents to tell Nahkai he could end the interview and leave was only one of many factors to consider.

Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit found the other factors to outweigh any failure to inform Nahkai he was free to end the interview and leave. These factors include: 1) the vehicle remained unlocked; 2) Nahkai could look down and see that the vehicle was unlocked; 3) Nahkai was never searched, handcuffed, or touched; 4) Nahkai was the first to mention sexual abuse; and 5) Nahkai sat in the passenger seat of the vehicle without any physical restraints. The court concluded that a reasonable person in Nahkai’s position would not have understood the situation as the “functional equivalent of formal arrest” and he was not “in custody” for Miranda purposes. Because he was not entitled to a Miranda warning, the agent’s questions did not present a Fourth Amendment issue and, as such, they were voluntary statements and admissible at trial.

United States v. Tyler
No. 24-6035 (10th Cir. 2025)

Oklahoma City Police officers were conducting surveillance for a wanted person, Karen Gonzalez, and spotted her as the passenger of a vehicle in a local gas station parking lot. When she exited the vehicle, officers ordered her and the driver, Jonas Tyler, to show their hands and walk backwards towards the officers. Gonzalez was handcuffed, brought to a curb, and sat calmly for the rest of the encounter. Gonzalez was placed under arrest for her outstanding warrant, but Tyler had no relation to her case, nor did he have any warrants of his own.

Without suspicion he was involved in any crime, officers handcuffed and extensively patted Tyler down, confiscated his phone, and placed him in the back of a police car.

Police officers asked for consent to search Tyler’s car and he refused; he was left in the back of the police car for approximately fifteen additional minutes while officers waited for a narcotics officer and a canine. The canine conducted a sniff of Tyler’s vehicle and alerted to the presence of narcotics. Officers then searched the car and recovered a firearm and six grams of suspected fentanyl pills. Tyler was subsequently charged with a state law violation for possession of a firearm by a previously convicted felon, entered a conditional plea to the single-count indictment, and reserved the right to appeal on the issue of suppression.

On appeal, Tyler argued that officers may not extend a detention to conduct a sniff absent reasonable suspicion that some crime is afoot, even if such a sniff would be otherwise permissible. Thus, he claimed his continued detention after Gonzalez had been handcuffed and arrested was unreasonable because he was not dangerous and officers had no reason to suspect a crime had been, was being, or would be committed. The government disagreed, stating that the delay was reasonable because Gonzalez had not yet been patted down by a female officer, as required by department policy.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Tyler’s argument, noting the government’s only interests were arresting Ms. Gonzalez and doing so safely. Once Gonzalez was handcuffed and confined to an area of the officer’s choosing, Tyler should have been allowed to leave the scene even if officers were waiting for a female officer to conduct a pat-down. By keeping Tyler detained for the sole purpose of allowing a canine handler to arrive and conduct a sniff of his vehicle, officers violated Tyler’s rights and any evidence discovered against him from that point on must be suppressed.

[As noted here some months ago, Point of Law will from time-to-time reprint cases summarized by other sources. The following cases are recent 10 th Circuit opinions as reviewed by the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center’s Legal Division]:

(Reprinted from The Informer, FLETC Legal Division, November, 2025)

United States v. Watkins, a/k/a Crazy Gun
No. 23-6210 (10th Cir. 2025)

A motel manager told police officers that a man matching the description of a carjacking suspect was staying in Room 231. The rooms were accessible only from open-air walkways around a 6 central courtyard. Room 231 was a second-floor unit at the end of one of the walkways. The walkway extended a few feet past the door, which faced a perpendicular walkway. One of the room’s windows, above an air-conditioning unit, overlooked the extension. There was a short railing enclosing two sides of the extension. The room was accessible from the parking lot via an outdoor staircase. Below are two photographs depicting the outside of Room 231.

The officers climbed the exterior stairway and walked to room 231. One of the officers looked into the window above the AC unit, where the curtains were open approximately one-inch.

Inside, the officer saw Watkins sitting on a bed. The officer saw a handgun with an extended magazine next to Watkins. After the officers arrested Watkins, they obtained a search warrant for Room 231, where they seized, among other things, a handgun, an extended magazine and ammunition.

The government charged Watkins with being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition.

Watkins filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in Room 231.

First, Watkins claimed that the officer violated the Fourth Amendment when he physically intruded upon the curtilage of the motel suite. Curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of the home. In this case, the court reviewed the two photographs above, which depict the outside of Room 231. The court concluded that the photo evidence established that the walkway, including the extension next to Room 231, on which the officer stood, was part of the motel’s common area and it was freely accessible to all staff, guests, and visitors. As such, the court held that the extension was a place accessible to the public, not an area “intimately tied” to the motel room; therefore, it was not considered curtilage, and the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment when he stood there and made his observations.

Next, Watkins claimed that even if the walkway’s extension was not curtilage, the officer’s peering through the one-inch gap in the otherwise closed window curtain intruded upon his reasonable expectation of privacy in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Again, the court disagreed. A person in a dwelling has no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to what can be seen, heard, or smelled by someone in a public place with one’s natural senses. Here, the officer made his observations from a place freely accessible to the public, the motel’s open-air walkway, using only his unaided eye. Consequently, the court held that the officer’s observations did not violate Watkins’s reasonable expectation of privacy.

United States v. McGregor
No. 23-1399 (10th Cir. 2025)

Two Aurora, Colorado, police officers assigned to the Department’s Gang Intervention Unit (GIU) were on patrol in a residential area when they observed a white Nissan traveling 25 mph 7 over the speed limit. When the officers activated their vehicle’s lights and sirens to initiate a stop, both officers observed the driver making ‘furtive gestures’ before pulling his vehicle over.

Specifically, the first officer observed the driver “leaning to the left and then leaning to the right, and at one point leaning so far over to the right that [the officer] lost sight of the driver”.

The second officer made similar observations; he noted that the driver “leaned way over to the passenger’s side” and that “this was a dramatic lean-over that [was] frantic and abrupt”. Like the first officer, the second officer also recalled that the driver “got his whole body over the console moving over to the right such that at one point in time [the officer] couldn’t see the driver”. These observations caused both officers to harbor personal safety concerns, with the first officer stating that he was “worried that the driver was either concealing or attempting to conceal something or retrieving something from the passenger’s side of the car”. All these observations were made after the officers activated their lights but before the driver came to a stop.

As officers approached the vehicle, one officer observed the driver, Clover McGregor, put his hands and head outside of the vehicle, which made the officer “uneasy” because he thought the driver was tracking his location. It was then that both officers recognized McGregor as part of an “extremely violent criminal street gang involved in armed robberies, car jackings, high-speed pursuits, and aggravated assaults involving weapons” based on their prior experience in the GIU.

When the first officer began to question McGregor, McGregor revealed that he was on parole for robbery and that he was driving to a urinalysis appointment as a requirement of his parole conditions. When the officer then asked McGregor for his driver’s license, he began “reaching all around in different areas” with his hands inside the car, which made the officer nervous because McGregor’s wallet was clearly visible in his lap. The officer then asked McGregor to place his hands behind his head and step out of the vehicle. Once McGregor exited, the first officer patted him down for weapons and, finding none, asked him to sit down on the curb next to the car. The officers then searched the passenger seat of McGregor’s vehicle and discovered a gun. McGregor was arrested and charged with one count of possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

McGregor moved to suppress the gun from evidence as the fruit of an unlawful search because officers did not have reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous. The district court denied the motion, McGregor entered a conditional guilty plea, and reserved his right to appeal the suppression ruling, and this is his appeal.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the denial of the motion to suppress and agreed with the lower court’s decision. The court concluded that, while each of the factors cited by the officers considered alone may not have justified a warrantless search, they did justify the search when considered as part of the totality of circumstances facing the officers that day.

Specifically, the court noted the following factors: (1) the “furtive gestures” which were described in great detail by the officers in terms of what they observed and how they perceived these gestures based on their training and experience; (2) the officers’ knowledge that McGregor was affiliated with a violent local gang; and (3) his admitted criminal history as a convicted robber on parole. With each of these factors considered together, it provided the officers with reasonable and articulable suspicion that McGregor was presently armed and dangerous and provided the officers with lawful authority to search his vehicle.

United States v. Huerta
No. 25-1050 (10th Cir. 2025)

A shooting occurred at a convenience store in Denver, Colorado in the early morning hours of June 26, 2023. Police identified a suspect, described as “a light-skinned black male who is bald with a thick beard and muscular build”. A security camera captured a photo of the suspect.

Police located the suspect’s vehicle, a black Ford Expedition several hours later, unoccupied and parked on the street outside of an apartment complex several miles from the shooting location.

Members of the Denver Police Department were provided with a photo of the suspect and put into position to surveil the vehicle while uniformed officers waited nearby.

Approximately twelve hours after the shooting occurred, a detective observed a black sedan pull up and park directly behind the Expedition. He radioed that two black females and “a black male [in] a white T-shirt, white hat [and] red pants” exited the black sedan and “milled around a little bit” before entering the complex. Shortly thereafter, the group exited the complex and got into a white Dodge Durango SUV parked behind the black sedan. One of the surveilling detectives instructed the uniformed officers to “stop [the Durango] out of the area just to be on the safe side” because of the “proximity of the target vehicle” because the black male was “somewhat similar in appearance” to the shooting suspect.

Nearby officers observed the Durango pull up to a pump at a gas station and noticed the Durango had expired plates and decided to stop it. The officers pulled up behind the Durango but did not have their emergency lights or sirens activated. The officers watched the Durango as the Durango’s driver and front seat passenger (a man later identified as Mr. Marshall) exited the vehicle and walked towards the gas station’s convenience store. Marshall, a black male, was thought to be the one who looked “somewhat similar” to the suspected shooter. But Marshall was not light skinned or bald, did not have a ‘thick beard” and had a tattoo on his face.

As an officer approached the back left door of the Durango, a female exited. As another officer approached the back right door of the vehicle, he noticed there was a fourth occupant later identified as Noah Huerta, who began to exit the vehicle with his left hand “somewhat near his waistband”. An officer instructed, “don’t reach for anything” and placed his hands on Huerta’s shoulder and wrist as he exited the car. The officer then turned Huerta around, held his arms behind his back, and placed handcuffs on him.

As Huerta asked what was going on, the officers told him to relax but he then tensed up and “started to turn his body, both left, right and kind of lean towards the car”. A nearby officer testified that Huerta was “squirmish” and that he tried to “cant his body away” and appeared not to be listening to the officer’s commands. The officers saw that Huerta “had a pouch attached to his belt loop”, with the pouch tucked into Huerta’s back right pocket. An officer felt the exterior of the pocket, determined there was a firearm magazine inside, and then asked if he had a gun, which Huerta denied. The officers patted down Huerta but did not find a firearm and then put him in the back of the patrol vehicle because Huerta was “all over the place”.

Officers conducted name clearances on Huerta and Marshall and learned that they both had violent felony convictions. Officers obtained consent to search the vehicle from the female driver and found a nine-millimeter handgun in the vehicle near Huerta’s seat. The magazine found on Huerta fit the recovered handgun. Huerta was arrested and charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm or ammunition contrary to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Huerta did not contest the validity of the stop based on the Durango’s expired plates, but he did move to suppress the firearm and magazine obtained from the search, arguing that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous to justify the pat down that yielded the magazine. He also argued that the subsequent search of the vehicle, premised mainly upon what the officers discovered during the unlawful frisk, was also inadmissible as the police lacked reasonable suspicion that any of the occupants of the vehicle were armed and dangerous. The district court denied Huerta’s motion to suppress, finding that the totality of the circumstances established reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous. In addition, the court ruled that, even if the pat down was illegal, the firearm would have been inevitably discovered during a protective sweep of the car.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed on both points and found that officers lacked lawful authority to conduct a pat down and that the officers wouldn’t have inevitably discovered the firearm during a protective sweep of the vehicle as they lacked reasonable suspicion to believe that Huerta – or any of the other passengers – were armed and dangerous.

First, the court looked at the government’s claim that they had information that the shooting suspect was in the Durango and found that any potential connection that the occupants of the Durango had to the suspect vehicle was attenuated at best because: 1) there was no information connecting them to the vehicle; and 2) they merely parked behind the target vehicle in an apartment complex in the daytime nearly twelve hours after the shooting. Further, the fact that Huerta shared some basic similarities with the suspect did not support the conclusion. Although both the suspect and Marshall were both back men with facial hair, the shooting suspect was described as a light skinned black male who was bald with a thick beard and muscular build. In contrast. Marshall was not bald, did not have a full beard, sported a notable tattoo on his face and was not light skinned. Additionally, the detective’s radio broadcast to stop the vehicle “just to be on the safe side” reflected nothing more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch”, rendering the frisk of Huerta, a passenger in a vehicle with Marshall, unreasonable under the circumstances.

Next, the court addressed the passengers’ decision to exit the vehicle and recognized that it may, at times, be suspicious for a motorist to walk away from his vehicle during an ordinary traffic stop but this was not such a stop. At the time the two front-seat passengers exited the vehicle and walked towards the convenience store, the patrol car had just pulled up behind the Durango without any lights or sirens activated. It was only several moments later, and after the occupants exited the vehicle, that a second patrol car pulled up with lights activated.

Accordingly, court concluded that it was not reasonable for the officers to find this behavior unusual, particularly given the fact that they were operating on a mere “hunch” that the suspected shooter was in the vehicle.

Finally, with respect to Huerta’s behavior, body camera video showed that officers exited and approached the Durango as Huerta exited the vehicle. He held a phone in his left hand and his right hand was visibly empty. As Huerta exited the vehicle, an officer grabbed him and, in a matter of seconds, turned him around and placed his hands behind his back. Given that Huerta appeared unaware of the stop, and how quickly he was restrained, the court did not think it was unusual that he would be “squirmish”, particularly because he was already restrained. Even though the government argued that Huerta made a “furtive” movement – moving his right hand up towards his waistline – as he was exiting the vehicle, the government admitted the movement was “slight” and “likely innocuous in hindsight”. Body camera footage did not show anything more than Huerta briefly placing his left hand on his thigh as he was exiting the vehicle.

The Tenth Circuit concluded that, even when considering the attendant circumstances individually and in the aggregate, the record did not support the “minimal level of objective justification” required under the reasonableness standard to believe Huerta was armed and dangerous.

Moreover, the Tenth Circuit rejected the lower court’s finding that the gun would have been inevitably discovered during a protective sweep of the Durango because the officers only asked the driver of the Durango for consent to search the car because they discovered the magazine during an unlawful frisk. As a result, the court concluded that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to believe that Huerta – or any of the other passengers – were armed and dangerous at the time they searched the Durango.

Last Friday was a bad hair day for a Kansas “sovereign citizen.”  Following a conviction for an inoperable tag light and driving while suspended, Dane Knoblauch appealed to the Kansas Court of Appeals raising certain sovereign citizen arguments such as lack of jurisdiction of the district court, and that Dane’s “driving” was not really “driving” since he had only been “traveling” while operating his car.

In its short opinion, the appellate panel quickly found nothing of value in Dane’s 46-page self-represented brief.  The judges said that Dane’s lengthy document “consists almost exclusively of various tangents and diatribes, asserting [that] he is somehow exempt or immune from being subject to the laws of Kansas as a sovereign citizen.”  “Such arguments have been found by other courts as ‘completely without merit, patently frivolous, and will be rejected without expending any more of this Court’s resources on their discussion’ . . . Simply put, ‘an individual’s belief that his status as a sovereign citizen puts him beyond the jurisdiction of the courts has no conceivable validity in American law.”

Dane’s “complaints are based on his subjective view of the law, which is not the law.”  “The law in the State of Kansas is set forth by our Legislature and applies equally to all persons in the State, irrespective of their individual consent and regardless of what they may wish it to be.  In other words, everyone in this State must follow the law as defined by our Legislature.”

Mic drop.

~ Colin

A recent Kansas Court of Appeals case provides a good review on roadside custody and interview requirements.  In the fall of 2022, Cory Helmstead was a backseat passenger in a car from which the driver had just been arrested for DUI.   When interviewed later after a search of the car, Helmstead had provided incriminating statements about his ownership of some THC evidence found near where Helmstead had been sitting.  Some of his statements were made before his having been Mirandized, and some statements were made after.  Helmstead was charged, lost his suppression motion before the trial court, and was convicted.  He appealed arguing that because he had been in “arrest custody” during the entire traffic stop that all of the incriminating statements were illegally obtained.  

The facts of the case are not important for this summary as its intent is to simply remind officers about some of the 4th and 5th Amendment law surrounding such an encounter.  Here is what the judges had to say to Helmstead:

"[U]nder the Fourth Amendment, a person is protected from unreasonable searches and seizures. But the Fifth Amendment protects a person's privilege against self-incriminating statements.”

“For purposes of a Fourth Amendment analysis, encounters between law enforcement officers and the public are generally classified under one of these categories:  (1) consensual encounters; (2) investigatory detentions, also known as Terry stops; (3) public safety stops; and (4) arrests . . . an investigatory detention or Terry stop allows an officer to detain any person in a public place if the officer reasonably suspects that the person is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime. Although a person is seized when stopped by an officer and the freedom to walk away is restrained, a person can be seized without actually being under arrest. When a person is temporarily seized under Terry—but not under arrest—that encounter is an investigatory detention.”

"By contrast, under the Fifth Amendment, statements stemming from custodial interrogation must be excluded unless the State shows it used procedural safeguards, i.e., Miranda warnings, to secure the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination . . . 'The Miranda safeguards are triggered only when an accused is (1) in custody and (2) subject to interrogation.”

“A custodial interrogation is defined as questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his or her freedom in any significant way. A custodial interrogation is distinguished from an investigatory interrogation, which occurs as a routine part of the fact-finding process before the investigation reaches the accusatory stage . . . At the heart of the custody analysis, the court must ultimately determine as a matter of law whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the interrogation and disengage from the encounter.”

“Roadside questioning during a routine traffic stop does not necessarily constitute a 'custodial interrogation' for Miranda purposes . . . This is because an ordinary traffic stop is quite different from the atmosphere of being interrogated at a law enforcement station, and most people understand that a traffic stop is normally brief and they will be free to leave once the stop is concluded . . . As the Berkemer Court predicted, under this nuanced case-by-case rule, "the police and lower courts will continue occasionally to have difficulty deciding exactly when a suspect has been taken into custody . . . It is possible that an investigatory detention from a routine traffic stop can transform into a custodial interrogation under unusual circumstances  . . . But additional factors showing that the person was "'in custody'" for practical purposes must be present to trigger the full panoply of protections under Miranda.”

“For instance, our Supreme Cout held that a person taken from a car at gunpoint, placed on the ground, and handcuffed was in custody for Miranda purposes.  Yet as the record shows, that was not the case here.”

“Our Supreme Court established eight factors to consider when determining whether an interrogation is investigative or custodial in nature:  (1) the place and time of the interrogation; (2) the duration of the interrogation; (3) the number of law enforcement officers present; (4) the conduct of the officer or officers and the person being questioned; (5) the presence or absence of actual physical restraint or its functional equivalent, such as drawn firearms or a stationed guard; (6) whether the person is being questioned as a suspect or a witness; (7) whether police escorted the person being questioned to the interrogation location or the person arrived under the person's own power; and (8) the result of the interrogation, for instance, whether the person was allowed to leave, was detained further, or was arrested after the interrogation. No one factor outweighs another, and the factors do not bear equal weight. A court must analyze every situation on its own particular facts.”

After analyzing the above factors in Helmstead’s event, the appellate panel agreed with the trial court that Helmstead’s pre-Miranda and post-Miranda statements were legally obtained.

~ Colin

A panel of the Kansas Court of Appeals has reversed a district judge’s earlier decision to uphold two questioned search warrants issued during a domestic violence investigation.  The opinion reminds law enforcement not to ask to search for things for which probable cause does not exist, and to remember to proof-read the search warrant documents before they are given to a judge to review.  

James Lee, his bail bond business, and Lee’s girlfriend stayed in the north side of a residence.  One of Lee’s friends, and that guy’s girlfriend, stayed in the south side of the house.  A domestic dispute broke out between the friend and the friend’s girlfriend during which the girlfriend was bloodied, and the police were called.  Lee and his girlfriend were not involved but were present.

When the injured girlfriend refused to cooperate, the officers sought a search warrant to search the residence for evidence of the fight including bloody items, damaged furniture, and “evidence to indicate the occupants or residents of the residence including, but not limited to cell phones, receipts, notes ledgers, address books, correspondence, utility bills, photo I.D.’s, photographs, videotapes, and/or DVD’s and digital media including, but not limited to cameras, USB drives, and computers.”  

The search warrant was issued and officers searched the house.  When an officer found  drugs in a small wooden box in Lee’s bedroom, officers obtained a second search warrant to search for additional drugs.  Officers located more drugs, paraphernalia, and cash in Lee’s closet that was used for his bail bond business, and Lee was charged with a drug trafficking offense.  He filed for suppression of both search warrants arguing that the first warrant was “overbroad” as to the “occupant of the residence” search authority; and, nowhere on the second warrant was the house’s address.  Lee’s arguments lost before the trial judge, he was convicted, and Lee was sentenced to 98 months in prison.  An appeal followed. 

Last week, the Court of Appeals reversed.  The opinion reminds us that the Fourth Amendment was enacted as a “response to the reviled ‘general warrants’ and ‘writs of assistance’ of the colonial era, which allowed British officers to rummage through homes in an unrestrained search for evidence of criminal activity . . . [and that] “places to be searched and the items to be seized must be described ‘particularly’ . . . to safeguard against fishing expeditions or other government overreach . . . especially . .  . in searches of one’s home.”

So, as for the first warrant, the panel questioned the need to confirm the identities of the occupants of the residence.  Since the officers already had that information from their initial investigation, allowing for such wide-ranging “occupant evidence” broadened the “scope of the first search warrant to well beyond a search for evidence of the alleged domestic violence incident” that in reality involved only the two persons in the south end of the house.  The panel agreed that there was probable cause to search for evidence of domestic battery, but no probable cause to allow for “a generalized search of all rooms of the residence . . . under the guise of trying to determine the occupancy of those living there.”  Although the panel did not say why, it further held that the good faith of the officers could not save the first warrant. 

As for the second search warrant, it too was D.O.A.  Since the second warrant was 1) based upon evidence of drugs “improperly seized based upon the faulty first warrant, . . . it is also invalid;” and, 2) because the preparing officers had failed to include the address of the residence to be searched, the second warrant too was to be suppressed.  Did good faith save this one?  Nope.  No reasonable officer could have believed that a search warrant that did not identify the place to be searched could be valid.

Bottom line: try not to use someone else’s earlier search warrant template when investigating a different kind of crime with a different kind of evidence; and, read over the SW package more than once.  The defense attorney probably will.        

~ Colin

(No reasonable suspicion of a crime justifying a car stop for obscured state name on license plate)

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

I try not to get into the weeds when alerting law enforcement about important decisions of our appellate courts.  Instead, I attempt to only pass along the information necessary for officers to be aware of changes that will affect their day-to-day activities.  However, now and then a case comes along that is so confusing that a few extra paragraphs are necessary.  This is one of those cases.

I fully admit that I am not the sharpest knife in the drawer.  I must also admit that I just do not understand how the justices found zero statutory support for the requirement that a license plate have a state name on it, and that the state name (being a required part of such license plate) has to be clearly visible, be free from foreign materials, and be clearly legible.

Unlike most summaries, I have attached here a copy of the opinion.  See pages 10 and 11 for the Court’s reasoning.  After a somewhat contorted journey through state and federal case law, K.S.A. 8-147, 8-1,141, 8-132(a), and 8-133, the opinion found itself discussing easily read letters and numerals, and apparently conflating license plates with registration decals.

My confusion probably comes from why any of that journey was necessary.  When faced with interpretation issues, courts turn to what is called statutory construction canons.  One canon is to read statutes in pari materia which means that "[i]n construing statutes and determining legislative intent, several provisions of an act or acts . . . must be construed together with a view of reconciling and bringing them into workable harmony if possible."  Courts have a duty "to reconcile the different provisions so as to make them consistent, harmonious, and sensible."

In that vein, see the following statutes concerning the license plate issue:

8-126a. Whenever in this act or in any other law of this state relating to registration of motor vehicles any of the following words or terms are used: 1. Number plate or plates. 2. License number plates. 3. License number plate. 4. Number plate. 5. Number plates. 6. Registration number plate. 7. License tags. 8. Tags; or any other word, term or phrase of similar import or meaning is used in any such law, the same shall be construed to mean and include any plate, tag, token, marker or sign issued under the provisions of this act for the purpose of identifying vehicles registered under the provisions of the motor-vehicle registration laws of this state or otherwise carrying out the provisions of such laws.

8-132. (a) Subject to the provisions of this section and K.S.A. 8-1,125, and amendments thereto, the division of vehicles shall furnish to every owner whose vehicle shall be registered one license plate for such vehicle. Such license plate shall have displayed on it the registration number assigned to the vehicle and to the owner thereof, the name of the state, which may be abbreviated, and the year or years for which it is issued.The same type of license plates shall be issued for passenger motor vehicles, rented without a driver, as are issued for private passenger vehicles.

8-133.
. . .
(c) Every license plate shall at all times be securely fastened to the vehicle to which it is assigned, to prevent the plate from swinging, and at a height not less than 12 inches from the ground, measuring from the bottom of such plate. The license plate shall be fastened in a place and position to be clearly visible, and shall be maintained free from foreign materials and in a condition to be clearly legible.

I just cannot see how those three statutes, when taken together, do not require license plates to have a state name, and that such state name be both clearly visible and clearly legible.  

After reading the opinion many times, I remain in the camp of every state and federal judge in Kansas who has for 42 years thought those statutes were pretty clear as to the intent of the Kansas Legislature.  

That all said, please record my dissent. 

Colin

Heads Up: Kansas officers may no longer stop cars solely for obstruction of a state name on a license plate!

Overturning decades of lower court decisions and law enforcement understanding, on July 3, 2025 the Kansas Supreme Court held that the inability to read the state name on a vehicle license plate is not a Kansas state traffic law violation.  

In 2021, Illinois resident Brian Beck was stopped in Kansas when a deputy observed Beck’s vehicle displaying a license plate frame that partially obstructed the state name “Illinois” on Beck’s tag.  During the stop a dog alerted to the odor of illegal drugs, the car was searched, and Beck was charged with multiple violations including transporting over two pounds of methamphetamine.

In the district court, Beck moved to suppress the evidence from the car arguing that the deputy had not had reasonable suspicion of a traffic crime to support the initial car stop.  The trial judge, citing to past caselaw, denied the motion.  Beck appealed and a panel of the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed.  Beck then asked the Kansas Supreme Court to review his conviction and it agreed.

Days ago, the Kansas justices reversed.  Yes, they said, K.S.A. 8-133 has been around since 1929.  And, yes, they said, lower state and federal courts have since 1983 all agreed that obstruction of the state name on a vehicle tag in Kansas was a violation of K.S.A. 8-133(c).  However, they said, all of those courts were wrong.  

K.S.A. 8-133(c) states in pertinent part, “ . . . The license plate shall be fastened in a place and position to be clearly visible, and shall be maintained free from foreign materials and in a condition to be clearly legible. . . “  But, after review of K.S.A. 8-132(a), 8-147, and 8-149, the justices could find no Kansas law that required that the state’s name be displayed on the license plate itself (Kansas law only requires that the annual registration sticker have “Kansas” or an abbreviation).  So, the justice said, how in the world could the obstruction of tag information not required by law be a violation of K.S.A. 8-133(c)?

The justices further held: 1) that since Kansas does not require “Kansas” to be on its license plates, it follows that it is also not a Kansas traffic violation to obstruct other state names on out-of-state tags; and, 2) K.S.A. 8-133(c) is not unconstitutional, it has simply been misread by everyone in the world, and thus officer good faith in Beck’s case is inapplicable.  So, the justices sent the case back to the trial court to reevaluate the suppression issue based upon their decision.

A couple of final thoughts:  

1. because the holding is at its heart a state law interpretation, the State will probably not be able to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.  Therefore, for everyone except Beck, the matter is settled unless and until the Kansas Legislature would amend K.S.A. 8-133 to require the state name on license plates (in addition to the current requirement on annual registration stickers).  
2. as for Beck and his pending criminal case, the Kansas justices apparently did not consider Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54 (2014).  There the U.S. Supreme Court held that “an officer's error of law in stopping a vehicle for a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-129(g) because one of its two brake lights was out was objectively reasonable, thereby justifying the stop, where the statute had not previously been construed by North Carolina's appellate courts, and under the language of the statute, it was reasonable to conclude that the use of the word ‘other’ meant that the rear lamps discussed in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-129(d) included brake lights.”

That sure sounds a lot like Beck’s case.  Hopefully, when the trial court gets Beck’s case back for further review of the suppression, it will take into consideration that Big Court 2014 mistake-of-law decision.

Colin

The following summary is from 5 Informer 25 (authored by the Legal Division staff of DHS at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center):

United States v. Maytubby, 130 F.4th 1194 (10th Circuit 2025)

A police officer interviewed Lance Maytubby at the police station regarding allegations of sexual abuse made by Maytubby’s nieces R.L. and Z.L. The interview, which was recorded on the officer’s body camera, took place in the break room at the police station with the dooropen. The officer told Maytubby that he did not have to talk, that he was not under arrest, and that he could leave at any time.

After Maytubby denied the allegations, the officer told him the two nieces’ stories were “dead-on similar,” and that the accusations had “stuff to back it up.” The officer then suggested that an “excuse” might explain what had happened, something like a mental-health issue, drinking, or drug use, but Maytubby continued to deny the accusations.

About a minute later, the officer told Maytubby that he needed to deliver an investigation report to the district attorney. He told Maytubby that he wanted the report to include all mitigating circumstances, like that Maytubby was a pastor who had made a mistake, had long been a “working man” and “family man,” and had just “acted out of character.” The officer reiterated he wanted to report that Maytubby made a mistake and that he was not “any kind of predator,” and that the behavior “hasn’t happened since.”

After he continued to deny the accusations, the officer explained that Maytubby’s denials put him in a difficult spot in reporting to the district attorney. The officer reminded Maytubby that he was not required to speak to him, and he reassured Maytubby that he was not going to arrest him that day. However, the officer also stated that his desire to include mitigating information in the investigative report depended on Maytubby’s admitting his sexual contact with his nieces. The officer told Maytubby, “I can’t help you out if you’re not honest to me, I just can’t. I can’t go in there and say, ... ‘Hey, he manned up. This is how it is. The guy acted out of character.’” Maytubby then told the officer that he wanted to go home, and the officer replied, “Okay.” A few seconds later, Maytubby confessed to sexually abusing his nieces.

The government indicted Maytubby for several sexual abuse-related offenses. Maytubby filed a motion to suppress his interview statements as involuntary, arguing that the officer’s coercive tactics overbore his will. The district court denied the motion. Upon conviction, Maytubby appealed.

The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” For an incriminating statement to be voluntary, it must not be “the product of coercion, either physical or psychological.” Coercion may take the form of “acts, threats, or promises which cause the defendant’s will to be overborne.”

First, the court determined that the fact that the interview lasted less than thirty minutes, the tone of the interview was conversational, the interview occurred in a break room with the door open, and the interview included no physical punishment weighed in favor of finding a voluntary confession.

Next, the court found that the officer’s offer to include mitigating facts in his investigative report to the district attorney if Maytubby admitted his nieces’ accusations were proper. The officer never implied that he had control over the sentence Maytubby might receive but instead made general statements to Maytubby about the benefit of cooperating, which has repeatedly been held to be a permissible interrogation tactic. Based on these facts, the court concluded that Maytubby’s statements were voluntary as none of the officer’s statements were coercive, and Maytubby’s will was not overborne.

For the court’s opinion: https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-7084/23-7084-2025-03-18.pdf

~ Colin